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What	are	the	prospects	for	Poland’s	rock	star-
politician	Paweł	Kukiz?
Although	Polish	rock	star-politician	Paweł	Kukiz’s	political	grouping	is	an	unstable	construct,	lacking
organisational	and	programmatic	coherence,	it	remains	the	Polish	government’s	only	potential	coalition
partner	and	could	still	emerge	as	king-maker	after	the	country’s	next	parliamentary	election.	Aleks
Szczerbiak	explains	that	the	key	to	its	survival	and	future	success	is	still	Mr	Kukiz’s	continued
credibility	as	an	‘anti-system’	fighter	against	the	political	establishment.
Paweł	Kukiz,	Credit:	Piotr	Drabik	(CC	BY	2.0)
Three	years	ago,	rock	star	and	social	activist	Paweł	Kukiz	caused	a	political	sensation	when	he	finished	third	in	the
first	round	of	the	May	2015	Polish	presidential	election,	picking	up	more	than	one	fifth	of	the	vote.	Standing	as	an
independent	right-wing	‘anti-system’	candidate,	Mr	Kukiz’s	signature	issue,	and	main	focus	of	his	earlier	social
activism,	was	strong	support	for	the	replacement	of	Poland’s	current	list-based	proportional	electoral	system	with
UK-style	single-member	constituencies	(known	by	the	Polish	acronym	‘JOW’),	which	he	saw	as	the	key	to	renewing
politics.	Then,	in	spite	of	running	a	poor	campaign,	his	newly-formed	Kukiz	’15	grouping	emerged	as	the	third	largest
following	the	October	2015	parliamentary	election,	securing	8.8%	of	the	vote	and	42	seats	in	the	460-member	Sejm,
the	more	powerful	lower	chamber	of	the	Polish	parliament.
However,	Mr	Kukiz’s	eclectic	candidates	list	produced	an	ideologically	diverse,	and	potentially	extremely	unstable,
parliamentary	caucus	comprising:	liberal-conservatives,	libertarians,	nationalists,	trade	unionists,	local	civic	activists,
businessmen	and	campaigners	for	single-member	constituencies.	Attempts	to	develop	a	series	of	satellite
associations	or	platforms	representing	different	ideological	and	programmatic	strands	(trade	union-agrarian,
libertarian,	nationalist	and	electoral	reformers)	proved	unsuccessful.	The	most	high	profile	of	these	–	the	so-called
‘Endecja’	association,	which	tried	to	draw	on	the	traditions	of	the	pre-war	‘National	Democracy’	movement	inspired
by	Polish	nationalist	politician	Roman	Dmowski	–	fizzled	out	after	its	leaders	left	the	Kukiz	’15	parliamentary	caucus.
Not	surprisingly,	therefore,	Mr	Kukiz’s	grouping	has	struggled	to	develop	a	distinctive	political	identity,	particularly
given	that	the	Polish	political	scene	has	become	highly	polarised	since	the	2015	elections	between	supporters	of	the
government,	led	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	party,	and	the	liberal-centrist	(so-called	‘total’)	opposition.
While	its	supporters	appear	divided	in	their	attitudes	towards	the	Law	and	Justice	government,	Kukiz	’15	has	tried	to
position	itself	as	a	‘constructive’	opposition.	Consequently,	for	a	long	time	Mr	Kukiz	was	the	only	opposition	politician
to	maintain	regular	contacts	with	Law	and	Justice	leader	Jarosław	Kaczyński	–	who,	although	he	does	not	hold	any
formal	state	positions,	exercises	a	powerful	behind-the-scenes	influence	in	determining	the	government’s
programmatic	and	strategic	priorities.
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Mr	Kukiz’s	grouping	also	tried	not	to	become	directly	involved	in	the	bitter,	ongoing	conflicts	between	Law	and
Justice	and	the	liberal-centrist	opposition	over	constitutional	issues.	While	often	criticising	the	government’s	handling
of	these	disputes,	Kukiz	‘15	refused	to	join	other	opposition	groupings	in	street	protests	organised	by	the	anti-
government	Committee	for	the	Defence	of	Democracy	(KOD),	leading	to	accusations	that	it	was	Law	and	Justice’s
informal	coalition	partner.	Kukiz	’15	also	strongly	opposed	moves	by	the	European	Commission	to	invoke	the	so-
called	Article	7	‘rule	of	law’	procedure	against	the	Polish	government,	and,	tapping	into	widespread	popular	concerns
about	the	potential	security	and	societal	cohesion	risks	posed	by	mass	Muslim	migration,	backed	Law	and	Justice	in
its	vehement	opposition	to	Poland	being	obliged	to	accept	migrants	from	the	Middle	East	and	North	Africa	under	the
EU’s	compulsory	relocation	scheme.
Strained	relations	with	the	ruling	party
However,	over	time	Kukiz	’15	has	become	increasingly	critical	of	the	Law	and	Justice	government.	It	has	continued
to	try	and	position	itself	as	the	most	genuinely	reformist	‘anti-system’	political	grouping	by,	for	example,	promoting
more	direct	democracy	and	referendums	triggered	by	civic	initiatives.	In	some	respects,	Kukiz	’15	has	also
developed	into	one	of	the	most	pro-free	market	groupings	currently	represented	in	parliament,	criticising	what	it	sees
as	excessive	business	and	economic	regulation	by	state	officials.	At	the	end	of	last	year,	it	clashed	bitterly	with	Law
and	Justice	when	the	government	proposed	an	amendment	to	the	local	election	law	abolishing	single-member
constituencies	(Kukiz	‘15’s	signature	issue)	in	councils	covering	more	than	20,000	residents.	Kukiz	‘15’s	harshest
criticisms,	however,	have	been	of	party-linked	appointments	to	state	bodies	and	what	it	argues	are	the	continued
privileges	enjoyed	by	state	officials	and	political	elites	under	the	Law	and	Justice	administration,	as	part	of	a	broader
critique	of	the	phenomenon	that	it	refers	to	as	‘partocracy’.
Last	summer,	Mr	Kukiz	also	attempted	to	develop	a	political	alliance	with	Poland’s	Law	and	Justice-backed	President
Andrzej	Duda	after	the	latter	vetoed	two	of	the	government’s	flagship	judicial	reform	laws	in	July.	Mr	Kukiz	tried	to
present	these	vetoes	as	a	major	political	success	for	his	grouping.	However,	the	judicial	reform	bills	were	eventually
passed	in	a	modified	form	with	Mr	Duda’s	support,	and	nothing	materialised	from	speculation	that	Mr	Kukiz	could
play	a	key	role	in	attempts	to	build	a	new	‘presidential’	political	party,	other	than	a	further	deterioration	of	the	rock
star-politician’s	relations	with	the	ruling	party.
Maintaining	a	stable	base	of	support
The	only	common	denominator	uniting	Kukiz	’15’s	disparate	ideological	tendencies	appeared	to	be	their	opposition	to
the	constitutional	foundations	of	the	post-1989	Polish	state	and	its	dominant	elites,	together	with	a	vague	‘anti-
systemness’	that	Mr	Kukiz	was	felt	to	embody.	This	led	many	commentators	to	predict	that	the	grouping	would
implode	as	soon	as	it	was	forced	to	confront	issues	that	brought	its	ideological	incoherence	to	the	fore.	For	sure,	14
deputies	have	left	the	Kukiz	‘15	parliamentary	caucus	since	the	election,	six	of	whom	formed	the	‘Free	and
Solidaristic’	(WiS)	parliamentary	circle	led	by	legendary	former	anti-communist	activist	Kornel	Morawiecki.	Mr
Morawiecki	was	elected	on	the	Kukiz	’15	ticket	but	is	now	a	strong	supporter	of	the	government;	not	surprisingly,
given	that	his	son	Mariusz	has	been	Law	and	Justice	prime	minister	since	last	December	and	was	previously	deputy
prime	minister	responsible	for	economic	affairs.	However,	partly	because	it	has	been	prepared	to	tolerate	a	relative
lack	of	parliamentary	voting	discipline,	the	Kukiz	’15	caucus	has	not	disintegrated	and	is	still	the	third	largest	with	29
members.
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Moreover,	opinion	polls	suggest	that	Kukiz	‘15	has	actually	maintained	a	reasonably	stable	electoral	base:	the
‘Pooling	the	Poles’	blog	that	aggregates	voting	intention	surveys	currently	shows	the	grouping	averaging	around	8%
support.	In	spite	of	the	fact	that	Mr	Kukiz	has	not	really	come	up	with	any	new	ideas	or	initiatives,	and	his	grouping
can	point	to	very	few	substantive	political	achievements	since	the	election	(apart	from	securing	a	few	nominees	on
public	broadcasting	and	judicial	supervisory	bodies),	a	substantial	bloc	of	voters	clearly	still	feels	that	Mr	Kukiz	has
remained	true	to	his	‘anti-system’	principles	and	is	the	most	credible	opponent	of	the	political	establishment.	This
widespread	anti-establishment	feeling	is	particularly	(although	not	exclusively)	evident	among	younger	voters:	an
August-September	2017	survey	conducted	by	the	CBOS	polling	agency,	for	example,	found	that	56%	of	Kukiz	‘15
voters	were	in	the	18-35	age	category	(which	comprises	only	25%	of	the	electorate	as	a	whole)	and	20%	of	them
were	under	25	(7%	of	the	electorate).	Many	of	these	younger	voters	originally	supported	Mr	Kukiz	because	they
became	increasingly	disillusioned	with	a	status	quo	that	appeared	to	offer	them	an	invidious	choice	between	moving
abroad	to	take	jobs	that	fell	well	short	of	their	abilities	or	remaining	in	a	country	which	they	felt	offered	them	few
prospects	for	the	future.	Three	years	later,	many	of	them	still	do	not	identify	with	either	Law	and	Justice	or	the	liberal-
centrist	opposition.
A	pivotal	role	in	the	future?
Indeed,	Kukiz	’15	could	still	play	a	pivotal	role	in	Polish	politics	because	it	is	currently	Law	and	Justice’s	only	realistic
potential	coalition	partner	if	the	ruling	party	should	fail	to	secure	an	outright	majority	at	the	next	parliamentary
election,	scheduled	for	autumn	2019.	This	is	quite	likely:	had	the	United	Left	(ZL)	electoral	coalition	won	only	0.4%
more	of	the	votes	at	the	2015	election	then	it	would	have	crossed	the	parliamentary	representation	threshold	and
thereby	deprived	Law	and	Justice	of	its	majority.	The	same	scenario	could	also	play	out	after	this	autumn’s	local
elections	in	many	of	Poland’s	16	regional	assemblies,	the	only	local	government	tier	contested	on	national	party
lines.	Although	in	the	previous	2014	local	polls	Law	and	Justice	won	the	largest	share	of	the	vote	in	half	of	these
regional	authorities,	because	of	its	weak	coalition	potential	it	was	only	able	to	secure	control	of	one	of	them:
Podkarpackie	province,	where	the	party	won	an	outright	majority	of	council	seats.	Without	the	backing	of	Kukiz	’15,
therefore,	Law	and	Justice	could	once	again	fail	to	take	a	control	of	regional	authorities	even	where	it	wins	the
largest	number	of	seats.
The	problem	for	Kukiz	’15	is	that	council	elections,	because	they	require	political	groupings	to	stand	thousands	of
local	candidates,	favour	established	parties	with	well-developed	grassroots	organisational	structures.	Kukiz	’15	has
failed	to	build	up	such	networks	and	its	leader	fell	out	with	many	of	the	local	government	and	civic	activists	who
formed	the	backbone	of	his	2015	presidential	election	campaign,	so	it	has	had	to	advertise	for	candidates	on	the
Internet.	This	is	exacerbated	by	the	fact	that	Kukiz	’15	did	not	register	as	a	formal	political	party,	thereby	making	it
ineligible	for	ongoing	state	funding;	a	decision	which,	given	its	vote	share	at	the	last	election,	has	cost	the	grouping
around	7	million	złoties	per	annum.	Kukiz	’15’s	objectives	for	these	local	elections	are,	therefore,	fairly	modest:
crossing	the	5%	threshold	(which	political	groupings	require	to	secure	parliamentary	representation	nationally)	in	the
aggregated	nationwide	share	of	the	regional	council	vote;	and	achieving	at	least	some	minor,	symbolic	victories	in
local	mayoral	elections.
Mr	Kukiz’s	popularity	remains	the	key
Kukiz	’15	remains	an	unstable	political	construct	and	the	grouping’s	lack	of	organisational	and	programmatic
coherence,	together	with	its	socially	and	ideologically	heterogeneous	electoral	base,	casts	serious	doubts	over	its
future	prospects.	Since	the	collapse	of	communism	in	1989,	Poland	has	seen	a	series	of	‘anti-system’	parties
emerge,	some	winning	as	much	as	10%	of	the	vote,	only	to	then	fizzle	out	and	disappear.	Kukiz	’15	could	easily	end
up	as	simply	the	latest,	transitory	repository	of	such	protest	votes.	At	the	same	time,	however,	there	is	also	a	good
chance	that	Mr	Kukiz’s	grouping	will	survive	to	contest	the	next	parliamentary	election	and	possibly	even	emerge	as
the	king-maker	in	the	new	parliament.	Although	Mr	Kukiz’s	apparent	unpredictability	and	shifting	political	allegiances
may	have	put	Law	and	Justice	off	the	idea	of	working	with	him	as	a	coalition	partner,	Mr	Kaczyński’s	party	may	not
have	any	choice	if	it	wants	to	secure	control	of	a	significant	number	of	regional	authorities	after	the	autumn	local
elections,	or	remain	in	government	after	the	next	parliamentary	poll.
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In	fact,	the	key	to	Kukiz	‘15’s	continued	political	success,	and	even	survival,	remains	its	leader’s	personal	credibility
and	popularity.	Surveys	conducted	by	CBOS	have	consistently	found	Mr	Kukiz	to	be	among	Poland’s	top	three	or
four	most	popular	politicians:	in	May	he	secured	a	50%	approval	rating	(20%	disapproval),	way	ahead	of	any	other
opposition	leaders.	Although	he	can	be	gaffe-prone	and	react	emotionally	under	pressure,	Mr	Kukiz’s	impulsive
behaviour	outside	of	established	political	norms	–	which	would	be	fatal	for	more	mainstream	politicians	–	is	viewed
by	many	of	his	supporters	as	evidence	of	his	authenticity.	This	support	could	erode	very	quickly	if	they	cease	to	see
him	as	the	most	credible	fighter	against	‘the	system’	but,	for	the	moment,	his	supporters	seem	to	be	willing	to	give
Kukiz	’15	the	benefit	of	the	doubt,	and	back	the	grouping	as	long	as	they	continue	to	view	its	leader	as	the
embodiment	of	opposition	to	the	Polish	political	establishment.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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